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NOTE
Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India and
Rex v. Cia Pervana de Vapores, S.A.:
The Seventh Amendment and the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976
INTRODUCTION
Suits against foreign sovereigns and their agents or instrumentali-
ties are being brought in increasing numbers by American citizens and
businesses in United States courts to resolve legal disputes, both at the
federal and state levels. Although formerly absolutely prohibited,'
suits against foreign sovereigns acting in various commercial and busi-
ness capacities have been allowed in the United States since the 1940s.2
In response to both the multitude of foreign policy and legal problems,
and the general confusion arising out of the attempts by the executive
and judicial branches of government to decide when foreign sovereignimmunity should be granted in United States courts,3 Congress enacted
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).4 The FSIA
1 Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (Italian government owned and oper-
ated commercial ship held immune from suit in an American court); The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (French naval vessel held immune from suit in an
American court). For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes
14-18.
2 Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex Parle Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
For a more detailed discussion of these developments, see infra notes 14-19 and accompanying
text.
3 For a more detailed discussion of the development of this problem, see infra notes 20-34
and accompanying text.
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976).
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codified what is commonly called the "restrictive" theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, which allows American plaintiffs to bring suit
against foreign sovereigns acting in a commercial or business capacity.5
The FSIA grants federal district courts original jurisdiction in
"any nonjury civil action"6 brought by American plaintiffs against
"foreign states."7 In addition, the FSIA allows a foreign state as de-
fendant to remove any action brought against it in a state court to the
proper federal district court.8 As a result, virtually all suits brought
against "foreign states" as defined in the FSIA will be tried in a non-
jury rather than a jury trial.9
Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India'° and Rex v. Cia. Pervana de
Vapores, S.A. 11 are two recent cases brought under the FSIA in which
American plaintiffs challenge the propriety of the denial of jury trials.
Both claims are based on the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
5 The "restrictive" theory has replaced the "absolute" theory of foreign sovereign immunity,
which prohibited all suits against foreign sovereigns in any capacity. For a discussion of this
change in approach, see infra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). This section reads:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in con-
troversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this
title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable
international agreement.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1976). These subsections read:
For the purposes of this chapter-
(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means an entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c)
and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976). This section reads:
(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. Upon
removal the action shall be tried by the court without a jury. Where removal is based upon
this subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any
time for cause shown.
9 However, diversity jurisdiction, and thus jury trial, is allowed where the foreign state is
plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976).
10 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
11 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982).
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States, than according to the rules of common law.'2
Both the Third and Fourth Circuits found no violation of the Seventh
Amendment, although through slightly different analyses.' 3
This note will examine the contributions and implications of these
decisions for nonjury civil actions brought under the FSIA, and con-
sider the potential impact of the present conflict on judicial interpreta-
tion of the Seventh Amendment.
First, the history and development of the two main approaches to
foreign sovereign immunity will be examined. Second, the facts and
rationales of the Williams and Rex opinions will be outlined in this
context. Third, this note will address the question of whether consider-
ation of the constitutionality of the FSIA can be avoided by statutory
construction. Fourth, since the Seventh Amendment issue must be
confronted, the Williams and Rex decisions will be measured against
the Supreme Court's recent Seventh Amendment decisions. Finally,
alternative approaches to Seventh Amendment analysis and the foreign
policy implications of nonjury trials under the FSIA will be reviewed
in an attempt both to unify Seventh Amendment theory and find a le-
gal approach for use by the courts which is consistent with United
States foreign policy needs.
HISTORY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN THE UNITED STATES
The principle of absolute immunity of foreign sovereigns from suit
in the United States developed early in United States law. Clearly ar-
ticulated for the first time by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon,'4 the concept was based upon the need to re-
spect the dignity of and maintain courtesy to individual foreign na-
tions. As Chief Justice Marshall explained:
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by in-
tercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices
which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have con-
sented to a relaxation in practice ... of that absolute and complete juris-
diction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute
of every sovereign ... would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 35-47.
14 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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nor their sovereign rights as its objects.15
Although the controversy in The Schooner Exchange resulted in
the establishment of immunity only for military vessels,' 6 the Supreme
Court did directly apply the principles of absolute sovereign immunity
to commercial vessels owned by a foreign sovereign in 1926 in Berizzi
Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro." The Court there stated that it thought a
distinction in treatment for military vessels was not a viable one, be-
cause protecting the economic advancement of the nation is as much a
proper government function as is the operation of a naval force.'"
Over time, however, courts began to acknowledge the potential
foreign policy complications that might arise out of granting or denying
immunity to foreign sovereigns from suits for liabilities relating to their
commercial transactions. By the 1940s, the Supreme Court moved
away from treatment of foreign sovereign immunity as solely a ques-
tion of international law, and adopted an approach which began con-
sidering its various political implications. To this end, the Court
recognized the need to consider political concerns, in the form of rec-
ommendations from the executive branch, in deciding whether to grant
or deny immunity to foreign nations.' 9
Shortly thereafter, the State Department formally rejected the ab-
solute view of sovereign immunity and adopted the "restrictive" theory
of sovereign immunity in the "Tate Letter."20 The State Department
document recognized immunity from suit for sovereigns in cases in-
volving their public acts (jure imperil), but not for private or commer-
cial acts by foreign states or entities which they control (jure gestionis).
Under this policy, a judicial decision on the issue of immunity for a
foreign sovereign depended, in large part, on whether a recommenda-
tion was made by the State Department.2'
Unfortunately, the distinction between jure imperil and ure ges-
15 Id. at 136-37.
16 Id. at 135.
17 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
18 Id. at 574.
19 Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (In denying sovereign immunity to a vessel owned
by the Mexican government but operated by a private corporation, the Court stated: "it is a
guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in
such cases, that the courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of
foreign affairs." Id. at 35.); Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) ("[Clourts are re-
quired to accept and follow the executive determination that the [Peruvian-owned] vessel is im-
mune." Id. at 588.).
20 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, State Department, to the Attorney General
(May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976).
21 Jurisdiction of S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.S. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations ofthe Comm on the Judiciary, 94th
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ionis was not easy to apply in actual cases. Some standards were ar-
ticulated in response to this problem,2 2 but differentiating between the
two categories remained problematic. 23
In response to the confusion in the courts and the need for a con-
sistent policy toward the foreign sovereign immunity question, Con-
gress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.24 The
FSIA codified the restrictive theory of immunity, which has been
adopted "[iln virtually every country. 2 5 In addition, the Act was in-
tended to follow the lead of almost every other nation in the world by
making sovereign immunity "a question of international law decided
exclusively by the courts and not by institutions concerned with foreign
affairs. 26
According to the House Report on the FSIA, the Act was seen as
serving four main objectives. First, the Act codified the "restrictive"
approach to sovereign immunity.27 Second, the FSIA would ensure
that immunity decisions in the courts are made on legal grounds, using
due process. 28 Third, the Act established procedures for serving pro-
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, State Department) [herein-
after cited as Hearings on H.S. 11315].
22 See, e.g., Victory Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (Jure imperil was held to be limited to these five categories: "(1) inter-
nal administrative acts, such as explusion of an alien [] (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization
[;] (3) acts concerning the armed forces [;] (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity [;] (5) public
loans.").
23 The confusion in determining what is a commercial activity of a foreign sovereign remains
even under the FSIA. See generally Comment, Suing a Foreign Sovereign Government Under the
United States Antitrust Laws: The Needfor Clarification ofthe Commercial Activity Exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657 (1979).
24 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976).
Congress saw application of the "Tate Letter" policy as having two main problems. First, the
adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in that document puts the State Depart-
ment "in the awkward position of a political institution trying to apply a legal standard to litiga-
tion already before the courts." Second, bringing the matter up for State Department review
leaves the initiative for review to the foreign state. Together, these considerations leave the pri-
vate litigant in considerable doubt as to whether his suit will be allowed to stand. H.R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8-9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6606-07.
25 Id. at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6608.
26 Hearings on H.S. 11315, supra note 21, at 26-27. See also Martropico Compania Naviera,
S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina), 428 F. Supp.
1035, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (In holding that the FSIA's removal provisions do not apply to actions
pending on the Act's effective date, the court explained that the FSIA provides a "unitary rule" for
addressing questions of sovereign immunity, eliminating the role of the State Department and
thereby conforming with almost every other nation's practice.).
27 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 24, at 7, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6605.
28 Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6605-06.
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cess on and getting jurisdiction over a foreign state.29 Finally, the bill
provided a means by which creditors could enforce final judgments.3
The House Report on the FSIA briefly mentions the rationale for
providing only for nonjury trials under the Act. Jury trials are ex-
cluded in actions against foreign states3' because "[a]ctions tried by a
court without a jury will tend to promote uniformity in decision where
foreign governments are involved. ' 32 In addition, a foreign state as a
defendant has the option of removing an action brought against it in
state court to a federal district court.33 The purpose of such removal is
to increase the potential for consistent treatment of foreign states in
American courts. To this end, any demand for a jury trial made by a
plaintiff in a state court will be extinguished by removal to a district
court.3 4
THE WILLIAMS AND REX DECISIONS
Both Williams and Rex are tort actions brought by American
longshoremen injured while working on ships owned by the defendant
corporations, the Shipping Corp. of India and Cia. Pervana de
Vapores, S.A. Both defendant corporations are wholly owned by their
governments, India and Peru, respectively."
In Williams, the plaintiff filed suit in a Virginia state court. The
defendant corporation removed the suit to the District Court of the
Eastern District of Virginia, and moved to strike plaintiff's jury trial
demand on the basis of section 1441(d) of the FSIA. The district court
granted the motion to strike, holding that jurisdiction was based solely
on section 1441(d), and could not be based on diversity jurisdiction.
Additionally, the district court found no violation of the plaintiffs right
to jury trial.36
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. Dis-
missing any possibility that jurisdiction over the foreign defendant
29 Id. at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6606.
30 Id.
31 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
32 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 24, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6611-12.
33 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
34 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 24, at 32-33, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6631-32.
35 Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 982 (1982); Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982).
36 Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980), a'd, 653 F.2d 875
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
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could be had under the diversity of citizenship provisions of title 28,17
the court moved to the Seventh Amendment issue. Adopting a "static"
historical approach to the Seventh Amendment articulated by the
United States Supreme Court,38 the court in Williams looked to see if
the right to a jury trial existed at English common law in 1791 in suits
against foreign sovereigns. The Williams court held that there was no
right to a trial by jury in such suits at common law because suits against
foreign sovereigns were not even allowed at common law.39
The action brought in Rex differs from that in Williams in several
major respects. The Rex action originated in the federal district court
under plaintiff's assertion of diversity jurisdiction. Finding the defend-
ant corporation within the class of "citizens or subjects of a foreign
state," the district court held that diversity jurisdiction under section
1332(a)(2) allowed the plaintiff a jury trial.40 The Third Circuit dis-
agreed with this reading of the statute, however, and reversed the dis-
trict court's ruling allowing a jury trial.4'
Upon resolution of the question of statutory construction, the
Third Circuit proceeded to the plaintiff's contention that forcing his
claim to be tried in a bench trial denied him his Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial.42 On this question, the Third Circuit attempted to
pursue a somewhat different line of inquiry than the Fourth Circuit in
Williams,43 claiming that the proper approach to the question was to
inquire whether the plaintiff's action "is in the nature of a legal remedy
similar to a suit at common law."44 In spite of its use of this more
elastic test,45 the Rex court concluded, as did the Williams court, that
actions against foreign sovereigns did not exist at common law.
37 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 48-78 and
accompanying text.
38 Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S.
474 (1935). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
39 Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d at 881-82.
40 Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 61
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982).
41 Rex, 660 F.2d at 64-65. For further discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying
notes 48-78.
42 Rex, 660 F.2d at 65.
43 For a discussion of the apparent "differences" in the approaches taken by the Third and
Fourth Circuits, see infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
44 Rex, 660 F.2d at 67. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit specifically rejects the type of
approach used by the Third Circuit: "To invoke the Amendment, it is not enough that the nature
of the plaintiff's action is 'legal' rather than maritime or equitable; the action must also be brought
against a defendant who was suable at common law in 1791." Williams, 653 F.2d at 883.
45 The development of the "elastic" approach to the Seventh Amendment is discussed infra in
notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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Rather, the Rex opinion noted that until the passage of the FSIA in
1976, determination of validity of suits against foreign sovereigns had
been within the discretion of the executive branch.4 6 Thus, as in Wil-
liams, the Rex court held that since the action in that case did not fall
within the ambit of the Seventh Amendment, jury trial was not consti-
tutionally mandated.47
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
In an effort to avoid confronting the Seventh Amendment jury
trial issue in cases challenging the validity of the FSIA, a number of
courts have engaged in contorted readings of the provisions of the
FSIA and section 1332,48 thereby clearly contradicting the intent of the
authors of the FSIA.49 It is a well-established principle of statutory
interpretation that statutes be read to avoid the creation of constitu-
tional issues and be accorded a presumption of constitutionality.50
Thus, the provisions of the FSIA at issue should not be invalidated
without a clear showing of unconstitutionality. 5'
Prior to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, cor-
porations formed under the laws of foreign states were considered for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction as "citizens or subjects of a foreign
state. '' S2 Thus, until the passage of the FSIA in 1976, any suit brought
against such a corporation in federal court was based on sections
1332(a)(2) and (3), which included the class of "foreign states or citi-
zens or subjects thereof."53 However, the amendments to section 1332,
passed with the FSIA in 1976, 54 have given rise to two interpretations
46 Rex, 660 F.2d at 68.
47 Id. at 69. See infra text accompanying notes 100-07 for commentary on the Rex decision.
48 See cases cited infra notes 55-56.
49 See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
50 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,
448-49 (1830).
51 Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1971 (1982).
52 Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882).
53 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (pre-FSIA):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the mat-
ter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different states and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof
are additional parties.
54 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 3, 90 Stat. 2891, 2891
(1976).
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of the statutory language and, thus, two potential bases for jurisdiction
over foreign sovereign-owned corporations.
Some courts, including the district court in Rex,55 have held that
diversity jurisdiction over foreign sovereign-owned corporations can
still be obtained under the provisions of section 1332.56 Other courts,
including the circuit courts in Rex 57 and Williams,58 have rejected this
view,59 asserting that federal district courts can only obtain jurisdiction
over these corporations through section 1330 of the FSIA.6 0 According
to the latter view, foreign sovereign-owned corporations can be in-
cluded only in the FSIA's definition of "foreign state."'" Thus, these
corporations cannot be properly included in the class of "citizens or
subjects of a foreign state" covered by the new language of section
1332. This position is strongly supported by the fact that Congress re-
moved the term "foreign state" from section 1332 when it passed sec-
tion 1330, limiting diversity jurisdiction to only the narrowed class of
"citizens or subjects of a foreign state."' 62
55 Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 466-67 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 660
F.2d 61, 63-65 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982).
56 Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd, 667 F.2d 1151 (4th
Cir. 1982) (The district court denied defendant corporation's motion to strike jury demand, stating
that jurisdiction under section 1332 was proper. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, stat-
ing that section 1330(a) and section 1441(d) (removal provision) are the only routes to jurisdiction
over the defendant, and that the jury demand should have been denied.); Lonon v. Companhia De
Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (FSIA held not to preclude diversity
jurisdiction and concomitant jury trial).
57 660 F.2d at 63-65.
58 Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
982 (1982).
59 See, e.g., Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d
872, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1981) (Held that: (1) federal court jurisdiction over a foreign state or agency
or instrumentality thereof must be based on section 1330(a), which provides for nonjur trials, and
(2) denial ofjury trials to plaintiff longshoremen did not, under the "static" approach, violate the
Seventh Amendment); Jones v. Shipping Corp. of India, 491 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Held
that jurisdiction over foreign sovereign-owned corporations is obtainable only under section 1330,
which requires nonjury trials). Cf. Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 428 (5th
Cir. 1982) (Held that plaintiff had no right to jury trial, but refused to decide whether section
1330(a) provides the sole basis for jurisdiction).
60 For the text of section 1330(a), see supra note 6.
61 For the text of this definition, see supra note 7.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (with FSIA amendments). This section reads:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a
State or of different States.
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Deciding whether a suit is based on section 1332 or 1330 is critical
to any determination of whether a jury trial is to be allowed, for the
diversity jurisdiction provisions of section 133263 traditionally have
been read to require jury trials, while the original jurisdiction provision
of section 1330 provides for only nonjury trials. 64
In an early interpretation of the FSIA, the District Court for the
District of Columbia held in Icenoge v. Olympic Airways, S.A. 65 that
jurisdiction over the defendant airline, a corporation wholly-owned by
the government of Greece, could properly be based on diversity juris-
diction provisions of section 1332, rather than on section 1330 of the
FSIA. In particular, the Icenogle court asserted that the FSIA created
a choice between these two approaches to obtaining jurisdiction.66
In order to bring the defendant airline under section 1332, the Ice-
nogle court held that although the airline could be a "foreign state"
under section 1330(a) of the FSIA,67 it could also be held to be in the
section 1332(a)(2) and (3) class of "citizens or subjects of a foreign
state. 68 If held to be within this latter definition, the defendant could
be reached for suit through diversity jurisdiction under subsections
1332(a)(2) or (3), and a jury trial would be required.69
This rationale, which was also used by the district court in Rex,7 0
has been criticized by a number of commentators,7' as well as the Sec-
ond72 and Third73 Circuits.
The Second and Third Circuits' reading of the FSIA is not only
logically based on the language of the Act,74 but also follows one of the
main purposes for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: to ensure
consistency of decision-making75 and reduce uncertainty about proce-
63 See supra notes 53 and 62.
64 For the text of section 1330(a), see supra note 6.
65 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979).
66 Id. at 38. This position of the Icenogle court was recently urged by the petitioner in Wil-
liams in his request for review by the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner's Brief for Certio-
rari at 29-32.
67 See supra note 7.
68 Icenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 38-40.
69 Id.
70 Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 466-68.
71 See, e.g., Note, Sovereign lmmuni y: Jury Trial, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 720 (1979); Brief for
Appellees at 6-15, Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982).
72 Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 875-76
(2d Cir. 1981).
73 Rex, 660 F.2d at 63-65.
74 Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 877 (2d
Cir. 1981); Williams, 653 F.2d at 880.
75 "Actions tried by a court without jury will tend to promote a uniformity in decision where
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dural questions in suits involving foreign states. 76 Uncertainty in inter-
pretation on the issue would be eliminated if Congress amended
sections 133 1(a)(2) and (3) to clearly state that the phrase "citizens and
subjects of a foreign state" no longer includes "foreign state" as defined
in section 1603(a).
If the approach of the Icenogle court was a valid one, there would
be an opportunity for American plaintiffs to bring suit based on diver-
sity jurisdiction against these foreign states and corporations, and
thereby obtain a jury trial. However, since most courts and commenta-
tors agree that diversity jurisdiction and, thus, jury trials cannot be had
in suits against foreign states under the FSIA,77 the constitutional issue
of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial under the FSIA must be
met directly by the courts.78
APPLYING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT TO THE FSIA
In determining whether a right to trial by jury exists under the
Seventh Amendment, the initial inquiry must be whether the suit in
question falls within the class of "suits at common law." The earliest
Supreme Court decisions on this point explained the phrase by drawing
a line between suits "at law" and suits "in equity":
The phrase "common law," found in this clause [of the Seventh Amend-
ment], is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime
jurisprudence.... It is well known, that in civil causes, in courts of eq-
uity and admiralty, juries do not intervene .... By common law, they
[the framers of the amendment] meant . . . suits in which legal rights
were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies
were administered ....
foreign governments are involved." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 24, at 13, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6611-12.
76 "At present, there are no comprehensive provisions in our law available to inform parties
when they can have recourse to the courts to assert a legal claim against a foreign state." Id. at 7,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6611-12.
In its brief to the Fourth Circuit, the defendant Shipping Corp. of India pointed out an incon-
sistency in the Icenogle approach in the context of section 1441(d) (28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976)),
which provides for removal of these actions from state to federal court for nonjury trials. The
brief asserts that it would be illogical for Congress to forbid jury trials in removal cases while
allowing jury trials in cases of original jurisdiction. Brief for Appellee at 8, Wlliams. This posi-
tion was adopted by the Fourth Circuit, which stated: "We find such a bifurcated analysis of the
jurisdictional sections of the Act to be unwarranted." Williams, 653 F.2d at 880 n.4.
77 Except under section 1332(a)(4), which allows diversity jurisdiction in suits where the for-
eign state is plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976).
78 Note that the dissenting judge in Rex disagreed with the majority on the Seventh Amend-
ment issue, not this statutory construction issue. 660 F.2d at 69-70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
79 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (emphasis by the Court). Attempts
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In determining whether an action involves such a legal right, "re-
sort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law estab-
lished at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in
1791."8o It is generally agreed that the rules of the common law to be
used are those of England, rather than of the states.8 ' If a legal right is
found, the right to a jury trial, with all of its fundamental elements,
must be provided. 2
Since the passage of the Seventh Amendment in 1791, however,
the Supreme Court has developed two approaches to the problem of
whether a jury trial should be required in a particular case.
The Fourth Circuit in Williams adopted the historical approach to
determining Seventh Amendment challenges in what is commonly re-
ferred to as a "static" form.83 Under this analysis, which has not been
used by the Supreme Court in any recent Seventh Amendment cases,84
the court looks only to see if the action in question in a particular case
existed under the English common law in 1791. If so, then a right to
jury trial is granted. If not, then there is no Seventh Amendment prob-
lem, and the challenge is unsuccessful."
In applying this static historical test to the FSIA, the Williams
court looked to the opinions of the Supreme Court in The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon86 and Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S Pesaro.7 The
Fourth Circuit decided that since the latter cases already held that suits
against foreign sovereigns could not be brought in England at the time
of the Seventh Amendment's passage, it was clear that an action like
the one brought by the plaintiff in Williams could not have been
brought under the English common law in 1791, and thus no right to a
jury trial existed.88
at historical analysis of the intent of the framers of the Seventh Amendment can be found in
Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973), and
in Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289 (1966).
80 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
81 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
82 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
83 Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 881 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
982 (1982). The "static" approach is also used by the Second Circuit in Ruggiero v. Compania
Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir. 1981). The second, or
"elastic," approach used by the Third Circuit in Rex, is discussed infra in the text accompanying
notes 89-106.
84 Two of the most recent uses of the "static" analysis include Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc.
v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935), and Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 476 (1935).
85 See. Williams, 653 F.2d at 881-82.
86 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
87 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
88 Wl7liams, 653 F.2d at 881-82.
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In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has abandoned the
"static" approach to the Seventh Amendment for a more flexible, or
"elastic," approach.89 As a result of the practice of trying both legal
and equitable issues together in the federal courts, the Court held in
1959 that courts trying mixed cases of law and equity should exercise
discretion to preserve jury trial wherever possible.90 The Court in Bea-
con Theatres v. Westover9t not only felt compelled to follow the Sev-
enth Amendment's jury trial command, but also found echoes of the
Seventh Amendment mandate in Congress' intent to preserve the right
to jury trial as "inviolate."92
Subsequent decisions of the Court clarified the need for a more
expansive interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, thus including
suits not allowed at common law in 1791, but still "in the nature of"
suits which were allowed at the time.93 In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,94
the Court held that the plaintiff trademark owners' claim for money
damages based on a material breach of contract was an action "wholly
legal in nature" and thus subject to the Seventh Amendment's jury trial
provision.95 In Curtis v. Loether,96 an action brought under the fair
housing provisions of title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was held
to require a trial by jury. The Court stated:
[When Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordi-
nary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no func-
tional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be
available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically
enforced in an action at law.
97
89 The elastic approach looks at whether the suit is one "in the nature of" an action at com-
mon law. For a discussion of this elastic approach, see infra notes 93-99.
90 Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
91 Id.
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
93 This elastic test is adopted by the Third Circuit in Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A.,
660 F.2d 61, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982). See infra note 100 and
accompanying text.
94 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
95 Id. at 477.
96 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
97 Id. at 195. The Court distinguished proceedings like the one in Curtis, which was to be
brought in district court, from cases involving administrative proceedings where the right to trial
by jury was denied, including Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), and NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Curtis Court stated that "the Seventh Amendment is
generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings." 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). The Court's deci-
sion in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977),
denying jury trials in hearings involving safety violations under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, would also fall into this group of administrative cases not covered by the
Seventh Amendment.
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The Court's decision in Pernell v. Southall Realty9" supported the
Curtis result. In Pernell, the Court held that an action to recover pos-
session of real property under the District of Columbia Code also in-
volved "rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an
action at law." 99
Consonant with these recent decisions of the Supreme Court, the
Third Circuit in Rex elected to adopt the elastic approach to the Sev-
enth Amendment, focusing on the remedy requested by the plaintiff-
"the proper inquiry is. . . whether his action is in the nature of a legal
remedy similar to a suit at common law.t ' c° After stating this test,
however, the Rex court shifted to an analysis like the one used in Wil-
liams, focusing on the nature of the defendants involved rather than on
the nature of the remedy sought.' 0 ' The court looked at the history of
foreign sovereign immunity and concluded, as did the Fourth Circuit
in Williams, that "[h]istory thus conclusively demonstrates that actions
against foreign sovereigns have never existed at common law."t2 The
Rex court explained that the right to bring such suits "has existed al-
ways and exclusively at the sufferance of the United States Department
of State."° 3 As a result, the Third Circuit held that the denial of a jury
trial in actions against foreign sovereign-owned corporations is not a
violation of the Seventh Amendment."°
If the Third Circuit had followed the elastic test it initially articu-
lated, however, the outcome would necessarily be different. The action
in Rex is one seeking money damages under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 10 5 Under Dairy Queen and Cur-
tis, actions for money damages are clearly legal in nature, and thus
require a jury trial. 1 6 Thus, applying the Supreme Court's elastic ap-
98 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
99 Id. at 375.
100 Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 67 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1971 (1982). The Third Circuit stated:
Appellant argues, and the second and fourth circuits agree, that the seventh amendment
protects only actions recognized at common law in 1791. We do not accept this static ap-
proach to a vital constitutional guarantee. . . . We must decide whether Rex's claim is a
"Suit at common law," but we do not view common law as frozen in 1791.
Id. at 66.
101 Id. at 70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 68.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 69.
1o5 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
106 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
477 (1962). For a discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
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proach, the Rex suit is also legal in nature, and should require a jury
trial.
The Rex court's extensive discussion of congressional policy con-
cerns underlying the decision to provide only nonjury trials under the
FSIA0 7 suggests that the Third Circuit side-stepped the elastic test's
inevitable result in order to uphold Congress' policy decision that jury
trials in suits against foreign states are undesirable. Indeed, the foreign
policy considerations referred to, both by the courts and Congress, in
the approval of nonjury trials against foreign states are quite
persuasive.
Congress thought that by providing only nonjury trials under the
FSIA, the uniformity in decisions involving governments would be in-
creased.08 The Rex court agreed that this increased uniformity in de-
cision-making would encourage foreign states to cooperate more fully
with the judicial processes of the United States.10 9 Both Rex and Rug-
giero suggest that foreign states operating within civil law systems will
neither understand nor trust the common law jury system" 0 and, thus,
would be unwilling to cooperate with it. According to Judge Friendly
in Ruggiero: "Whatever our enthusiasm over the jury may be, this is
not necessarily shared by foreign governments-particularly those
which may fear that at one time or another they may be politically
unpopular with Americans.""' Thus, the provision of only nonjury
trial actions may alleviate a foreign state's fears of prejudice and
reprisal.
Also important to Congress and the courts are notions of comity
and respect among nations. Actions brought against the United States
government can only be tried without a jury,"' and, thus, comity re-
quires that no other sovereign be forced to submit to procedures to
which even the host government is not subject." 3
Finally, the Rex court noted that it was inconsistent to state that
Congress has the power to take the large step of entirely removing a
foreign state's immunity from suit, but does not have the option of sim-
107 Rex, 660 F.2d at 67-69.
108 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 24, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 6611-12.
109 Rex, 660 F.2d at 69.
110 Id; Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 880
(2d Cir. 1981).
111 Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 880 n.12.
112 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
113 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 24, at 13, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6611-12; Rex, 660 F.2d at 67; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 880.
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ply modifying that immunity by providing exclusively nonjury suits.
Forcing a choice between jury trials in every case and the total inability
to sue foreign sovereign-owned corporations "would pose a Hobson's
choice for Congress and ultimately work to the detriment of injured
plaintiffs."' 14
In Williams, the defendant corporation argued that the benefit of
uniformity of decisions was a "functional justification" for denying the
right to jury trial under the rationale of Curtis v. Loether. "5 This posi-
tion was not accepted by the Fourth Circuit, however. It is apparent
from an examination of the rest of the Curtis opinion that a "functional
justification" for denying trial by jury exists only when the statutory
scheme would be substantially harmed by the forced use of juries in the
adjudicative process." 6 Such functional justifications are not present
when Congress provides for trial in the district courts, although such a
justification may be present in a variety of administrative proceedings,
or in specialized tribunals like the bankruptcy court.' ' This also sug-
gests that the other foreign policy considerations found by Congress
and the courts also would not fall within the "functional justification"
language of Curtis.
Thus, although there are a number of strong foreign policy argu-
ments favoring the establishment of nonjury trials in suits against for-
eign states brought under the FSIA, the elastic approach to the Seventh
Amendment clearly requires jury trials in such situations. The peti-
tioner in Rex found support for this position in Reid v. Covert,"18 which
upheld the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases
when civilians were tried by court-martial overseas:
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections
against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconve-
nient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine
and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitu-
tion and undermine the basis of our Government. If our foreign commit-
ments become of such nature that the Government can no longer
satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution,
that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes. But
we have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it which are
114 Rex, 660 F.2d at 69; Brief for Appellee at 12, Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d
875 (4th Cir. 1981).
115 Brief for Appellee at 11, Williams v. Shipping Corp of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981).
See also quotation from Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974), reproduced supra in text
accompanying note 97.
116 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
117 Id. This rationale is more fully discussed supra in note 97. See also infra note 121.
118 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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not there. 19
If the Supreme Court wants to uphold the nonjury trial provisions
of the FSIA, if challenged in that Court, several alternative approaches
other than constitutional amendment can be taken.
First, the Court could apply the "functional justification" to ac-
tions brought against foreign states in the district courts.' 20 This ap-
proach would be based on the idea that the foreign policy implications
of trials by jury against foreign sovereign-owned defendants would se-
verely undermine the effectiveness of the FSIA in obtaining jurisdic-
tion over these defendants. However, the strong language of the
Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether indicates that the finding of any
such functional justification in district court proceedings is not likely. 121
In addition, the allowance of a functional justification of nonjury trials
involving foreign states at the district court level might cause other
courts to find analogous justifications to deny jury trials in other types
of civil suits, thereby eroding the basic guarantee of the right to a trial
by jury.
Second, the Court could hold that the passage of the FSIA adds a
third class to the traditional denominations of suits as either federal
question cases or diversity cases: a sui generis class of actions against
foreign states. 122 This class of cases, since it was unknown at common
law, could be held to be outside the scope of the Seventh Amendment
and exempt from the jury trial requirement. 123 Thus, the Congres-
sional decision to eliminate trial by jury under the FSIA would be
proper. The advantage to this approach is that it limits the ability of
both the courts and Congress to create exceptions to the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury in other types of civil actions, because
is singles out only one new class of cases for unique treatment.
Third, the elastic approach could be abandoned and replaced by
the more rigid static approach used by the Fourth Circuit in Wil-
liams. 24 This option would leave to Congress the determination of
119 Id. at 14, quotedin Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29-30, Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores,
S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981).
120 See supra notes 97, 115-17 and accompanying text.
121 The Court stated:
when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the
district courts, where there is obviously no functional justification for denying the jury trial
right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort
typically enforced in an action at law.
415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
122 Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 876 (2d
Cir. 1981).
123 Id. at 881.
124 Williams, 653 F.2d at 881-82.
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whether a jury trial is required in any classes of actions created after
the Seventh Amendment's passage in 1791.125 Although this approach
allows Congress to consider the foreign policy implications of jury tri-
als in the enactment of the nonjury trial provisions of the FSIA, the
elastic approach will ultimately leave Congress with new authority to
deny jury trials in a variety of other types of civil cases. At the same
time, such an approach would limit the opportunity for judicial review
of the denial of jury trials. It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
would choose to so restrict its own authority in this area.
Thus, the best approach to resolving the constitutional conflict
would be to declare actions against foreign states to be a class sui
generis, thereby making such actions exempt from the jury trial
requirement.
CONCLUSION
The attention of Congress to the growing problem of legal dispute
resolution between American citizens and businesses and foreign sover-
eign-owned corporations resulted in the passage of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act in 1976. Although the Act codifies a unified
approach to the immunity issue and, thus, greatly improves the
processes by which foreign sovereign-owned corporations can sue and
be sued in United States courts, judicial interpretation of the Act's pro-
vision creating nonjury trials when these corporations are defendants
has only created additional confusion for those searching for a consis-
tent approach to Seventh Amendment cases.
Several solutions to the problems raised by litigants in this area
can be posed. First, Congress should clarify sections 1332(a)(2) and (3)
by explaining that the phrase "citizens or subjects of a foreign state"
does not include foreign states as defined in section 1603(a) of the
FSIA. This would forthrightly delineate Congress' intent to subject
these foreign states to suit solely through sections 1330 and 1441, which
provide only for nonjury trials.
Second, the confusion in decisions made under the Seventh
Amendment must be clarified. The Williams court's attempt to ignore
cases requiring the use of the elastic approach, and the Rex court's mis-
use of the elastic standard, clearly indicate that some moves must be
made to unify the decisional law in the area. The narrowest and easiest
change to implement would be to declare that suits against foreign
125 See Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial- A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 Nw. L. REV. 486, 517, 531 (1975).
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states are a class of actions sui generis and unknown at common law.
Thus, jury trials would not be properly required in such cases. In addi-
tion, this solution would prevent courts and Congress from randomly
chipping away at Seventh Amendment guarantees in other types of
civil suits. Without the implementation of this or another change in the
existing approach to Seventh Amendment questions, the mandates of
the Seventh Amendment in the context of the FSIA will continue to be
unclear, and lower court use of this body of law will necessarily lead to
inconsistent treatment of parties in cases where Seventh Amendment
disputes arise.
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